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Abstract 
Prior research provides evidence that people can improve their self-control performance 
through practice (e.g., Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). Building on the Strength Model of 
self-control (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), this work 
assumes that self-control practice operates by increasing the capacity or endurance of a 
domain-general self-control resource. However, recent developments that highlight the role of 
motivation in self-control performance (e.g., Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010; Job, 
Dweck, & Walton, 2010) suggest that changes in values, expectations, and beliefs may be 
driving the improvements over time. In the current study, I adapted a paradigm from the self-
control training literature (Muraven, 2010a) in order to examine the possible role of 
motivational mechanisms in self-control performance improvement. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three practice conditions: a self-control task (avoiding sweets) or 
two control tasks. Self-control performance and potential motivational mechanisms were 
assessed both before and after the two-week practice period. Consistent with earlier research, 
self-control practice was associated with improved performance on an initial self-control 
performance task; however, there was no evidence of improvement in a post-depletion self-
control task. Although self-control practice was not strongly associated with changes across 
potential motivational mechanisms, some exploratory analyses suggested that self-control 
instrumentality (beliefs that successful self-control is a means to central, self-relevant 
outcomes) may be an important predictor of self-control performance. I discuss implications 
for motivational models of self-control. 
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Introduction 
 Self-control, or the effortful overriding of a dominant response, has been described as 
“one of the most powerful and beneficial adaptations of the human psyche” and “among the 
most widely studied constructs in the social sciences” (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, 
p. 272; Duckworth, 2011, p. 2639). The value of self-control has long been appreciated. One of 
the Founding Fathers of the United States advised: “Educate your children to self-control, to 
the habit of holding passion and prejudice and evil tendencies subject to an upright and 
reasoning will, and you have done much to abolish misery from their future and crimes from 
society” (Benjamin Franklin, 1706 - 1790). Indeed, beyond its significance for pursuing 
everyday goals, researchers posit that self-control is at the root of many serious societal 
problems, including alcoholism (Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002), obesity (Elfhag & 
Morey, 2008), and violent crime (Denson, Capper, Oaten, Friese, & Schofield, 2011). One 
author goes so far to say there may be “no such thing as ‘too much’ self-control” (Duckworth, 
2011, p. 2639). Whether or not self-control is invariably positive, a certain minimum level is 
no doubt essential to human functioning and well-being. 
 One striking example of the powerful influence of self-control is the longitudinal 
follow-up of participants in the “marshmallow” paradigm developed by Mischel and 
colleagues. In this line of study, pre-schoolers were given a choice between an immediate, 
smaller reward (e.g., one marshmallow) and a delayed, larger reward (e.g., two marshmallows) 
(Mischel, Ebbessen, & Zeiss, 1972). Cognitive tests, parental reports, and teacher reports a 
decade later found that what at first blush might seem a trivial behavior—number of seconds 
preschoolers could wait for the larger reward (delay of gratification)—significantly predicted 
academic and social outcomes, such as verbal fluency, ability to cope with stress, and social 
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adjustment of these adolescents (Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Shoda & Mischel, 1990). 
Public policy research by Moffitt and colleagues (2011) provided further support for these 
findings with two large-scale longitudinal studies. In these samples, self-control performance 
in childhood was significantly related to physical health, substance dependence, personal 
finances, and criminal offending outcomes more than two decades later. Benjamin Franklin’s 
advice, it seems, rings true. 
 Research not only supports the notion that improving self-control is desirable, but 
equally importantly, that self-control performance can be improved (e.g., Muraven, 
Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Oaten & Cheng, 
2006a). The current study examines possible mechanisms that may underlie this self-control 
performance improvement. I begin by describing evidence that self-control performance can be 
improved through self-control training exercises, in the context of two competing theories of 
how self-control works: a literal strength (or resource-based) perspective and a motivational 
perspective. 
The Strength Model of Self-Control 
 The strength model, an influential model in the self-control literature, also known as 
ego depletion theory (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), proposes that exerting self-control draws on a limited, domain-
general resource. Consistent with many approaches, self-control is defined as the human 
mental capacity to inhibit immediate thoughts, temptations, and impulses in favor of more 
global or long-term goals; hence, self-control is one type of self-regulation (Fujita, 2011), 
whereby individuals manage their behaviors according to goals and perceived social standards. 
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The strength model makes three major claims about the way that self-control operates, 
given the assumption that self-control consumes a limited, domain-general resource 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000). First, 
the theory states that exerting self-control in one domain (e.g., suppressing an emotion) 
depletes the resource and makes individuals more likely to fail in subsequent self-control 
efforts—even in seemingly unrelated domains (e.g., resisting sweets). Second, the theory posits 
that the only way to restore the depleted resource in the short-term is through rest or 
physiological replenishment (e.g., ingesting glucose, Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Third, 
in the long-term, by practicing self-control over a period of time, the pool of resources can be 
expanded, allowing individuals to improve self-control performance, much like building a 
muscle. 
 Evidence for a resource-based depletion effect. The bulk of the research in the 
strength model tradition employs a two-task paradigm to test the core assumption that self-
control consumes or depletes a resource. In this paradigm, participants are first randomly 
assigned to a depleting (effortful overriding of an impulse) or non-depleting initial task; 
performance on a second self-control task, then, is the dependent measure. For example, in one 
of the earliest studies (Baumeister, Bratslavasky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), participants 
watched a sad movie clip from Terms of Endearment with instructions to either suppress their 
emotions (depletion condition) or to experience and express emotions naturally (non-depletion 
control), and subsequently, performed a mental problem-solving task. Participants who 
suppressed their emotions were less likely to persist in the problem-solving task. 
 There are now hundreds of conceptual replications of this resource depletion effect: 
exhibiting self-control on an initial task depletes performance on a second task (for a meta-
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analysis, see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). As might be expected from the 
very general terms of “overriding an impulse,” depletion manipulations have employed a wide 
range of behaviors, including presenting oneself to a skeptical audience (Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Ciarocco, 2005), ostensibly “taste-testing” radishes instead of eating nearby chocolates 
(Baumeister et al., 1998), and making a difficult self-relevant decision (Baumeister, Sparks, 
Stillman, & Vohs, 2008). Some of the most common dependent measures have included 
persisting on an anagram (i.e. letter-scrambling) task when the opportunity to leave is available 
(Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006), overriding the dominant response to process words in 
the Stroop task (Muraven et al., 2006), doing mental arithmetic (Vohs et al., 2005), and holding 
a spring-loaded handgrip until exhaustion (Muraven et al., 1998). 
 Overall, there is strong support for the idea that self-control performance declines after 
initial exertion (Hagger et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that these 
performance effects offer clear support for the strength model. As I discuss below, more recent 
work suggests the need to revisit the conclusion that self-control performance declines require 
the assumption of a depleted resource (e.g., Muraven, 1998, Tyler & Burns, 2009; Baumeister, 
Muraven, & Tice, 2000, Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010). 
 Evidence for a resource-based practice effect. While a large body of research has 
examined the depletion aspect of the strength model, relatively few studies have examined the 
second implication that practice can expand the resource. To my knowledge, only 14 studies 
have examined self-control improvement (Baumeister et al., 2006): undergoing just two weeks 
of self-control training has been linked to improved performance in laboratory tasks, including 
the Stop-Signal Task (Muraven, 2010a; Muraven, 2010b), which involves inhibiting a learned 
key-press response when a tone is played, and the Visual Tracking Task (e.g., Oaten & Cheng, 
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2006a), which involves focusing on three target circles while ignoring distractor stimuli. These 
two tasks are considered relatively raw measures of the one’s cognitive ability to inhibit a 
dominant response, which according to the strength model should be at the root of self-control 
ability in all domains. Indeed, relating more directly to real-world experience, similar two-
week training exercises have been linked to improved regulation of aggressive responses 
(Denson et al., 2011), reduced intimate partner violence (Finkel, DeWall, Slotter, Oaten, & 
Foshee, 2009), increased smoking cessation (Muraven, 2010b), and better control of impulse 
buying (Sultan, Joireman, & Sprott, 2012). Similar effects have been shown in the domains of 
exercise, academic study, and financial planning with self-control practice periods of two 
months (Oaten & Cheng, 2006a; Oaten & Cheng, 2006b; Oaten & Cheng, 2007).   
 The most commonly used paradigm includes a baseline measure of self-control, two 
weeks of self-control practice with monitoring, and a follow-up measure of self-control to 
assess changes from baseline (e.g., Muraven, 2010a). Because practicing self-control is 
assumed to have a direct effect on self-control performance by strengthening or expanding the 
resource, what is essential, according to the strength model, is that the practice task requires 
overriding an impulse or dominant response (Baumeister et al., 2007). Consequently, practice 
tasks have taken the form of avoiding sweets (Muraven, 2010a), keeping good posture (Sultan 
et al. 2012), using one’s non-dominant hand for various tasks (Denson et al., 2011), and using 
proper speech (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & Baumeister, 2007a).  
 Although many studies have not assigned participants to a control practice task (likely 
because effective control tasks are difficult to design), some studies have included control tasks 
to rule out the possibilities that self-control practice tasks have their effects simply because 
they are highly-involving, because of the difficulty of the practice tasks, or because they make 
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self-control highly salient. To address the argument that participants in the experimental 
conditions feel relatively more involved and thus place greater value on assigned laboratory 
tasks, Gailliot and colleagues (2007a) assessed post-practice self-regulatory success through 
daily life measures (e.g., eating behavior, studying), as opposed to having a follow-up lab 
session, and replicated the typical self-control improvement effect. Studies that have included 
practice tasks designed to control for task difficulty (Hui et al., 2009; Muraven, 2010a; 
Muraven, 2010b) provide some evidence that difficult tasks that do not require self-control are 
not enough to yield self-control improvement, though whether difficulty has truly been equated 
in these studies is not clear. Similarly, studies that have ensured that all participants are aware 
of the salience of self-control (and of the potential of the study to improve their self-control) 
have also found that the experimental self-control practice condition is uniquely linked to self-
control improvement (Muraven et al., 1999; Muraven, 2010a; Muraven, 2010b). However, I 
would argue that the disconfirmation of these latter two alternative explanations (task difficulty 
and self-control salience) is still relatively ambiguous, as I will address in more detail in the 
discussion of possible motivational mechanisms.   
 Within the context of the strength model, researchers have discussed two possible ways 
that a self-control resource, like a muscle, could “expand” via practice: via an increase in 
power or endurance. To assess these theoretically distinct mechanisms, several studies 
(Muraven et al., 1999; Gailliot et al., 2007a; Oaten & Cheng, 2006a; Oaten & Cheng, 2006b; 
Oaten & Cheng, 2007) have included two measures of self-control in the baseline and post-
practice lab sessions, one assessment prior to a depletion manipulation (an assessment of 
resource power or capacity) and one assessment post-depletion (an assessment of self-control 
resource endurance). In the study by Muraven and colleagues (1999), for example, each lab 
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session involved an initial test of holding a spring-loaded handgrip, a task of recording 
thoughts while specifically inhibiting thoughts of a white bear (a common depletion 
manipulation), and a second test of holding a spring-loaded handgrip. Thus, there were two 
ways to improve over the practice period: better initial performance (or power), as assessed the 
first handgrip test, and better sustained performance (or endurance), as assessed by the second. 
In this example, the authors observed an increase in endurance only, suggesting that self-
control practice may work primarily by increasing endurance rather than capacity or power. 
However, many demonstrations since (Muraven, 2010a; Muraven, 2010b; Denson et al., 2011; 
Sultan et al., 2012) have revealed improvements using only one measure of self-control 
performance (without depletion); thus, research provides evidence that self-control practice 
may lead to improvements in either self-control power or capacity.  
Impetus for a Motivational Model of Self-Control 
 While the strength model and its elegant analogy to a muscle have advanced the field 
immensely, a growing body of research provides evidence that self-control may not operate in 
the ways originally posited by the theory (e.g., Beedie & Lane, 2010; Job et al., 2010; 
Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010); rather, motivational factors appear to play a more 
central role. In this section I describe motivational factors that have been identified as playing a 
role in both depletion (self-control decrement) and practice (self-control improvement) effects.  
 Evidence for a motivation-based depletion effect. A number of studies provide 
evidence that manipulating the value of the self-control tasks (e.g., by suggesting that 
performance will help others or will yield additional monetary remuneration) attenuates the 
typical depletion effect (e.g., Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Muraven, 1998; Boucher & Helen, 
2011). Other subtle interventions have been successful as well: self-affirmation (reflecting on a 
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personal value) (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009), perceiving the exertion as a personal choice 
(Muraven, Gagné, & Rosman, 2008; Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006), and increased self-
awareness (Alberts, Martijn, & DeVries 2011) all attenuate the depletion effect. These findings 
suggest that in at least some situations, performance depends more on commitment, rather than 
ability, to exert self-control. 
 Second, a number of studies provide evidence that perceptions and beliefs play a 
powerful role in determining depletion effects. Being told explicitly that performance on a first 
self-control task should not hinder subsequent performance (and may even be re-energizing) 
eliminates typical depletion effects (Martijn, Tenbult, Merckelbach, Dreezens, & DeVries, 
2002). More recently, Job and colleagues (2010) found that people who believe that self-
control is an unlimited resource do not demonstrate depletion effects, both when implicit 
beliefs were measured and manipulated. Likewise, perceiving your own resources as depleted 
(through misleading feedback) better predicts self-control than actual previous exertion 
(Clarkson et al., 2010). Participants have even been shown to be “depleted” and “replenished” 
vicariously (Ackerman, Goldstein, Shapiro, & Bargh, 2009; Egan, Hirt, & Karpen, 2012): for 
example, when participants read about a depleting experience of someone with whom they 
closely identify (e.g., another student; not a professor) they assimilated by subsequently 
performing worse in a self-control task themselves.  
 Further support for the role of motivation comes from recent evidence that glucose is 
not a probable physiological mechanism for depletion effects (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Kurzban, 
2010; Molden et al., 2010). Although earlier work suggested that glucose may be the literal 
self-control resource (Baumeister et al., 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007b; Dvorak & Simons, 2009), 
mounting evidence suggests that glucose levels are not actually depleted during the typical 
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self-control exertion task (Kurzban, 2010; Khan, Vasquez, Gray, Wians, & Kroll, 2006; 
Molden et al., 2012) and that a glucose rinse can replenish energy without ingestion, 
suggesting that it may increase self-regulation via motivational, not energetic mechanisms 
(Molden et al., 2012). In short, the likeliest candidate for the resource itself turns out not to 
work as directly as once believed. 
 Taken as a whole, these findings imply that self-control depletion effects may be better 
explained by motivational factors than by the literal depletion of a single resource pool. Several 
alternative models (Kurzban, 2010; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012) have 
now emerged, highlighting the importance of resource perceptions rather than the hard limits 
of the resource itself. Across these models, two common themes or factors can be identified, 
related to expectations of self-control performance (e.g., “Will I be able to exert self-control?” 
“Will exerting self-control yield the outcomes I expect?”) and value (e.g., “How desirable are 
these outcomes to me?”). These factors not only reflect the accumulating evidence in the 
strength model literature that factors such as incentives and implicit beliefs matter, but also 
capture two core facets of classic motivational theories (Vroom, 1964; Atkinson & Feather, 
1966). 
 Existing evidence for a motivation-based practice effect. Relatively few studies have 
attempted to systematically examine motivational mechanisms for self-control improvement 
through practice. Though intuitively feasible that a literal resource or physiological capacity is 
directly strengthened or expanded, the strength model does not offer many ways of measuring 
this resource to test the proposed mechanism, apart from observing changes in self-control 
performance. However, a few studies have examined the possibility of an indirect pathway, 
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assessing potential alternative mechanisms (Oaten & Cheng, 2006a; Oaten & Cheng, 2006b; 
Oaten & Cheng, 2007; Muraven, 2010a; Muraven, 2010b; Hui et al., 2009).  
None of the existing studies provide strong support for an indirect effect of self-control 
training, although the examinations have been relatively sparse. Oaten and Cheng (2006a, 
2006b, 2007) examined self-reported general self-efficacy, stress, and emotional distress as 
potential mediators of the self-control practice effect. Although perceived stress and emotional 
distress were reduced during the self-control training regimen of physical exercise (Oaten & 
Cheng, 2006b), these factors did not mediate the improvements in self-control performance of 
participants in the experimental groups relative to control, as assessed by a visual tracking lab 
task and daily life indicators (e.g., doing household chores, keeping commitments). Similarly, 
self-efficacy and stress did not mediate improvements demonstrated in training programs of 
academic study and financial monitoring (Oaten & Cheng, 2006a; Oaten & Cheng, 2007). 
Importantly, however, research on self-efficacy suggests that perceived self-efficacy does not 
necessarily generalize from one situation to another, unless the situations are perceived as 
drawing on the same personal attributes (Cervone, 2000). Therefore, the general measure of 
self-efficacy that was employed in these studies may not be as sensitive to confidence about 
one’s ability to exert self-control specifically; it may be premature to rule out self-efficacy as a 
potential moderator. Furthermore, although Oaten & Cheng (2006a, 2006b, 2007) found no 
evidence that self-efficacy and stress assessed post-practice mediated self-control performance 
improvement, these analyses did not examine whether changes in self-efficacy or stress levels 
were related to self-control improvement.  
 Muraven (2010a, 2010b) also provided some examination of potential motivational 
mechanisms through practice reports that participants completed on a daily basis. In a lab-
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based study (Muraven, 2010a) and a smoking-cessation study (Muraven, 2010b) participants 
were assigned to one of four training tasks: two experimental self-control practice tasks that 
involved overriding impulses (avoiding sweets and holding a handgrip) and two control tasks 
that did not involve self-control (doing daily math problems and keeping a self-control diary). 
Over the two weeks of training, participants reported each day on their perceptions of practice 
tasks: specifically, how much they practiced, how much effort they felt they exerted, whether 
the assigned task required self-control, and whether they believed practicing would help build 
self-control. Participants in the control conditions were equally likely to believe practicing 
would help build their self-control, and yet they did not exhibit improved performance on a 
Stop-signal task (Muraven, 2010a) or in the number of days they successfully refrained from 
smoking (Muraven, 2010b). The conclusion, consistent with the strength model, was that the 
practice of effortful overriding itself is the “active ingredient” in building self-control, not the 
value of self-control or expectations for self-control improvement.  
Although these conclusions may suggest that there is no need to further examine 
intervening mechanisms, a closer look at the pattern of results suggests some important hints 
about intervening processes. First, the math and self-control diary conditions, designed to 
control for difficulty and the salience of self-control, may not have been equally effective as 
controls (e.g., participants in the math condition did not perceive that they exerted self-control 
to the same extent), a point I will return to in the discussion. Interestingly, Muraven (2010a, 
2010b) did find that, only for participants in the two experimental conditions, the average 
perceived effort was related to improved inhibition in the Stop-signal task at Time 2. However, 
Muraven (2010a) did not report whether changes in these daily measures were related to 
performance in the Stop-signal task at Time 2. This is another viable way to test for possible 
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mechanisms, as I adopted in my own approach. Additionally, in the smoking study (2010b), he 
found that participants were able to quit smoking longer to the extent that they felt that they 
exerted self-control on their practice task. This effect was strongest for participants in the 
experimental conditions. Thus, Muraven’s work provides some indication that expectations 
matter, though it is unclear whether these expectations must arise from a particular type of self-
control practice task. Furthermore, his designs did not permit a systematic examination of how 
the trajectory of such beliefs (e.g., believing you are exerting self-control, believing you will 
improve) may be related to changes in self-control performance.   
Lastly, Hui and colleagues (2009) provide some additional evidence that suggests the 
importance of considering motivational mechanisms of self-control performance. Participants 
in this study were assigned to a two-week training program in which the level of self-control 
practice demands were manipulated. In the high-demand practice (strong training) condition, 
participants had to complete difficult Stroop tasks and rinse with an unpleasant mouthwash 
every day. In the low-demand practice (weak training) condition, participants completed easy 
Stroop tasks and rinsed with a mild mouthwash every day. A third group of participants 
completed no practice tasks. The primary dependent measures were standard self-control tasks 
of mental concentration and cold tolerance; critically, cardiovascular measures were also used 
during these tasks to assess effort-related responses. They found that even participants in the 
weak training condition improved significantly in self-control performance, though less so than 
those in the strong training condition. Furthermore, of particular interest for the current study, 
the cardiovascular measures revealed that participants in the strong training condition actually 
had the highest effort-related responses in both post-practice self-control tasks. This suggests 
that practice may not have made the self-control tasks easier, but may have changed 
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perceptions of their attainability or value, such that participants in the strong-training condition 
were more willing to exert effort. Motivation and engagement, this suggests, are critical to 
improved self-control performance. 
Given the fairly limited and mixed evidence regarding possible mechanisms of self-
control improvement (e.g., tolerance of stress, value, expectations of improvement) and the 
number of candidates still entirely unexplored (e.g., self-control-specific self-efficacy, self-
control’s perceived personal relevance), I believe it would be premature to conclude that there 
are no viable mechanisms for self-control practice effects. And indeed, the growing body of 
work on the role of motivation in self-control depletion effects suggests that the notion of a 
literal self-control resource needs to be revisited. 
Proposed Mechanisms for a Motivation-Based Practice Effect  
 Possible mechanisms must be variables that can both plausibly influence self-control 
performance and could reasonably be expected to change over two weeks. Building on the 
factors identified by recent advances as moderators of the depletion effect (e.g., values, 
expectations, beliefs; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Martijn et al., 2002; Clarkson et al., 2010; 
Job et al., 2010), I propose that these factors likely play a critical role in self-control 
improvement.  
 Self-Control Value. One candidate mechanism involves how self-control practice may 
change people’s experience of the value of self-control in their lives. Recall that depletion 
effects are attenuated simply by reflecting on personal values, by feeling you are choosing to 
exert yourself, and by believing that exertion will pay off for yourself or others (Muraven & 
Slessareva, 2003; Muraven, 1998; Boucher & Helen, 2011; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; 
Muraven et al., 2008; Moller et al., 2006; Alberts et al., 2011). It appears that self-control 
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success is largely dependent on self-motivation. This general question can be thought of in two 
ways: “How desirable is self-control generally?” which I will refer to as self-control value, and 
“How relevant are self-control outcomes to important aspects of self?” which can be 
characterized as self-control instrumentality, the extent to which self-control is seen as a means 
to important ends (Vroom, 1964). These candidates also meet the criteria of flexibility: we 
might reasonably expect that after incorporating a new task into their daily lives, participants 
have an opportunity to see how such simple adjustments are possible and worthwhile (as Hui et 
al., 2009 suggest), thus motivating them to increase exertion. 
 Expectations. A related question is how confident participants are that they can 
effectively exert self-control. Recall that depletion effects are attenuated by being told that an 
initial task of overriding an impulse will not be depleting or by simply perceiving your own 
resources as high (Martijn et al., 2002; Ackerman et al., 2009; Egan et al., 2012). It appears 
that self-control success is also very dependent on one’s perception of one’s own abilities. 
Though general self-efficacy has not been shown to mediate prior self-control practice effects 
(Oaten & Cheng, 2006a; Oaten & Cheng, 2006b; Oaten & Cheng, 2007), self-efficacy beliefs 
specific to self-control have not been assessed as closely. Even Muraven’s closer examination 
(2010a, 2010b), with the daily questionnaire item “Practicing will help build my self-control,” 
yielded somewhat mixed results. Furthermore, this item perhaps most directly assessed the 
extent to which participants believed practice was effective, rather than directly assessing self-
control self-efficacy beliefs per se. Thus, it is important to more systematically and directly 
examine if self-control self-efficacy (“How much power do I have to exert self-control 
effectively?”) changes through self-control practice. Again, practicing a self-control task may 
reasonably be expected to improve this kind of confidence over a short period of time, 
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provided that participants are successful in their assigned task. This question can be seen as a 
complement to value in that participants must both believe they can attain self-control 
outcomes and believe that self-control outcomes are valuable to truly be motivated.  
 Beliefs. A final question is whether participants believe that exerting mental effort and 
resisting temptation are exhausting in the first place. These implicit theories of self-control 
have been investigated in the past (Job et al., 2010), using established scales to assess the 
degree to which participants endorse a limited resource theory (e.g., “resisting temptations 
makes you feel more vulnerable to the next temptations that come along”). As briefly discussed 
above, endorsing more unlimited theories of self-control predicts resistance to depletion effects 
(Job et al., 2010), both when these beliefs were measured and when manipulated. A 
longitudinal study demonstrated its generalizability, as well, which included predicting 
improved eating and study habits over multiple months, as well as progress toward a self-
selected personal goal. As these theories about the nature of self-control itself are flexible and 
have never been addressed directly in the context of self-control practice effects, they are also a 
very plausible candidate mechanism of self-control improvement. 
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Overview of Study 
 In this study, I examined potential mechanisms of the self-control practice 
improvement effect observed in a number of earlier studies (e.g., Oaten & Cheng, 2006, 
Muraven, 2010a). The study followed the typical two-week practice paradigm, with an initial 
and post-practice lab session to assess changes in self-control performance. As in the original 
demonstration (Muraven et al., 1999), the current study included assessments of self-control 
performance both when participants were and were not depleted in order to observe changes in 
both self-control “capacity” and self-control “endurance.” Critically, in addition to the lab 
sessions, participants completed a number of measures to assess potential mechanisms of self-
control practice improvement both before and after the two-week training period. 
 I hypothesized (1) that performance in both pre- and post-depletion self-control tasks 
would improve over the two weeks of self-control practice (avoiding sweets) and that they 
would improve relative to those in control conditions (math; self-control diary). Most 
importantly, I hypothesized (2) that individual differences in values, expectations, and beliefs 
(e.g., self-control value, self-control instrumentality, self-control efficacy, implicit theories of 
self-control) would predict baseline self-control performance measures and (3) that changes in 
these variables would mediate improvement from baseline to post-practice measures.
1
  
  
                                                          
1
 In the current paper, for completeness, I include in the method a description of every measure included in the 
study. However, I will be focusing on a limited subset of analyses. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 126 undergraduate students in psychology courses at the University of Waterloo were 
recruited to participate in this study for $20 and course credit. Additionally, participants 
received a ticket for a $100 lottery for each of the 14 daily online questionnaires they 
completed. Out of the initial 126 participants, 9 participants did the online questionnaire but 
never made it to the first session and 4 were cancelled by the first lab session due to external 
circumstances (e.g., technical error, snow day). Only 4 participants dropped out after 
completing the initial lab session (i.e., during the practice period), leaving 109 participants (87 
females and 22 males) who completed the entire study. They were a majority White (43%) and 
Asian (41%) students, with a mean age of 19.96 years (SD = 1.70). 
Participants completed an initial online questionnaire, a laboratory session 3-7 days 
later (M = 4.68, SD = 2.19) that involved assessment of baseline self-control performance, 14 
days of a self-control practice task, a second online questionnaire 1-3 days later (M = 1.56, SD 
= 0.88), and a final laboratory assessment of self-control 1-3 days after (M = 1.36, SD = 0.96) 
the second online questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three practice 
conditions: one experimental condition which did involve inhibiting a dominant response 
(avoiding sweets) and two intended as control conditions (keeping a diary of self-control 
efforts, doing daily math problems) based on conditions used in previous research (e.g., 
Muraven, 2010a; Muraven, 2010b).  
Practice Instructions 
 To replicate previous demonstrations of the effects of self-control practice (Muraven, 
2010a; Muraven, 2010b), the materials provided for all practice conditions led participants to 
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believe that practicing their assigned task regularly should build their self-control capacity. 
However, according to previous research in this tradition (Baumeister et al., 1998), only one of 
the practice conditions, avoiding sweets, actually involved effortful inhibition of an impulse. 
Thus, according to the strength model, only this condition should lead to improvements in self-
control (Muraven, 2010a).  
 In the avoiding sweets condition, participants were asked to refrain from eating dessert 
foods such as cakes, candies, pies, cookies, and any other sweet treats as much as possible in 
the following 2 weeks. Two participants who said they rarely eat sweets were re-assigned to a 
different condition.  
 In the self-control diary condition, participants received a diary packet for both weeks 
and were asked to log every time they exerted self-control, returning the packet at the second 
lab session. Each entry (up to 12 per day plus extras in the back) had space for the time, the 
temptation, the goal with which it conflicted, any strategies used to resist, comments, and four 
7-point scales that were carefully explained: strength of the temptation, strength of the goal, 
how much work went into resistance, and how successful the resistance was. A variety of 
examples were given in the instruction sheet and in a diary sample page, such as resisting the 
urge to eat unhealthy food and wanting to scream in anger but maintaining composure, to 
illustrate my definition of self-control as well as how to use the scales properly.
2
 As in 
Muraven’s (2010a, 2010b) studies, this condition was designed to rule out the possibility that 
any changes observed in the avoiding sweets condition could be due simply to the salience of 
self-control. 
                                                          
2
 Future planned analyses will permit examination of the relationship between diary responses and key dependent 
variables. 
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 In the math condition, participants worked on a set of simple arithmetic problems for 2 
minutes twice a day, in a packet provided to them and returned at the end of the practice 
period. In Muraven’s studies (2010a, 2010b), this condition was intended to be a task of 
approximately equal difficulty to avoiding sweets, to rule out the alternative explanation that 
practicing any demanding task could improve self-control. Although I questioned the 
assumption that these two tasks were equivalent in difficulty, I believed it was important to try 
to replicate faithfully the earlier studies; further, regardless of difficulty, it controlled for sense 
of involvement in the study (Gailliot et al., 2007a, Study 3). 
 Additionally, as in Muraven’s studies (2010a, 2010b), participants in all conditions 
were asked to complete a brief practice report every day to assess compliance and perceptions 
of the study. In the current study, I included 2 items asking whether or not they practiced 
(yes/no) and how many times; 1 item asking how much they were aware or thought about the 
task on a 5-point scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (All day); and, 3 items stating that practicing 
was “effortful,” “fun,” and “successful” to which they indicated their agreement, if applicable, 
on a 5-point scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). It was emphasized that 
regardless of actual persistence or success, what was most important was that they complete 
the practice reports honestly. To encourage compliance, I also gave participants a ticket in a 
lottery to win $100 at the end of the term for every practice report they filled out during the 2 
weeks, regardless of whether they reported complying or not. A research assistant monitored 
the completion of practice reports and e-mailed reminders for any missing days to maximize 
feedback. 
In-Lab Assessments of Self-Control 
 
 
20 
 
 The lab sessions involved a direct measure of self-control, a depletion manipulation, 
and a second measure of self-control (Muraven et al., 1999; Gailliot et al., 2007a). In the initial 
lab session, the three tasks were followed by the practice instructions, whereas in the final lab 
session, they were followed by payment and debriefing. The procedures in each session were 
identical although the specific materials (e.g., letters for the anagram task) were different 
across the two sessions.  
 Stroop task. Participants first completed the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), a task which 
has frequently been used as a measure of self-control (Job et al., 2010; Webb & Sheeran, 
2003). 
Participants were presented with one of four color words on a screen. On “congruent” trials, 
the ink color matched the text (e.g., the word “red” displayed in red font). On “incongruent” 
trails, the ink color did not correspond to the text (e.g., the word “red” displayed in blue font). 
The letters “R,” “T,” “Y,” and “U” on the keyboard were labelled with a red, blue, yellow, and 
green sticker, respectively, and the task of participants was to respond by pressing the key for 
the color in which the word was written as quickly and accurately as possible. Thus, on 
incongruent trials, participants must override the dominant response to read the color word. 
After 3 examples and 12 practice trials, participants did 97 experimental trials. 
 Stroop interference scores were calculated by a standard procedure (Salo, Henik, & 
Robertson, 2001): reaction times on correctly-responded trials were log-transformed (skew > 1 
for T1 and T2 reaction times) and the average log-transformed reaction times on congruent 
trials for each participant were subtracted from the average log-transformed reaction times on 
incongruent trials. Thus, higher interference scores represent more delay in responding on 
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incongruent trials relative to congruent trials, or, greater difficulty inhibiting the dominant 
response of reading. 
 Depletion manipulation. Following the Stroop task, participants completed a difficult 
version of the e-crossing task, a commonly used depletion manipulation (e.g., Molden et al., 
2012; Baumeister et al., 1998). Participants were first given a sheet of typewritten text and 
asked to cross out each instance of the letter e. After learning this rule, however, they were 
given a second sheet of typewritten text and asked to follow a more complex rule of crossing 
out every e, unless another vowel was found two letters preceding it or the next letter after. 
Thus, participants had to follow a complex new rule and inhibit the rule they had previously 
used.  
 Anagram task. The second self-control measure was a multiple solution anagram task, 
another commonly used measure of self-control. Participants were given 7 letters (“U, R, A, E, 
O, C, G” at Time 1 and “C, L, A, T, P, S, I” at Time 2) and had as long as they wanted to come 
up with as many solutions as possible. Thus, participants have to choose to persist, resisting the 
urge to quit (Baumeister et al., 1998).
3
 Both the length of time participants persisted (Muraven 
et al., 2006; Tyler & Burns, 2009) and the number of solutions (Gailliot et al., 2007a) were 
recorded.  
Online Questionnaires 
 At both time-points participants completed 13 scales (the possible motivational 
mechanisms) as well as a working memory task. Table 1 lists each scale as well as its source, a 
sample item or description, and scale anchors. All mechanism scales were presented in random 
                                                          
3
 Different specific letters were chosen for the anagram task at Time 1 and Time 2 to avoid practice effects. An 
informal pilot test had suggested that the letter sets were equivalent in difficulty; however, the results suggest that 
the Time 2 anagram task may have been easier. I am currently conducting a formal pilot test to examine if the 
anagram tasks differ in difficulty. Analyses that examine changes from Time 1 and Time 2 use Z-scores to control 
for this potential confound. 
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order. At the initial online session participants also completed a number of individual 
difference measures, detailed below. At the post-practice online session participants completed 
some additional measures related to their experience with the practice task and their 
expectations for the upcoming lab session.   
 I included 8 established scales: The New General Self-Efficacy Scale (Chen, Gully, & 
Eden, 2001), Limited Resource Beliefs (Job et al., 2010), Locus of Control (Craig, Franklin, & 
Andrews, 1984), Trait Self-Control (Tangney et al., 2004), Cognitive Appraisal (Skinner & 
Brewer, 2002), Implicit Theory of Personality (Dweck, 1999), Implicit Theory of Intelligence 
(Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999), and Self-Esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzensniewski, 
2001). See Table 1 for additional information. 
 Self-Control Value. To assess the extent to which participants found self-control 
valuable, I created a six-item Self-Control Value Scale (α = .814). Participants indicated their 
agreement on a 6-point scale from 1 (disagree) to 6 (agree) with the following items: “Exerting 
self-control is rewarding,” “Exerting self-control pays off,” “Self-control isn’t that important to 
me” (reverse-scored), “I want to be able to exert self-control effectively,” “I’d like to improve 
my self-control,” and “It is important to me to do my best at exerting self-control.” 
 Self-Control Instrumentality. To assess the degree to which participants view self-
control as a means to success in self-relevant domains, I created a 7-item Self-Control 
Instrumentality scale (α = .897) in which participants indicated how self-control success would 
improve several important aspects of their life, drawing on seven of Tomaka and colleagues’ 
(1999) aspects of the self (overall physical well-being, the well-being of my loved ones, self-
esteem, reputation with friends, reputation with family, likelihood of reaching important 
personal goals, performance at school). Participants indicated their agreement with one item 
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for each domain (e.g., Being successful at self-control will improve…my overall physical well-
being”) on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
 Self-Control Efficacy. To assess perceived self-efficacy specifically in the domain of 
self-control, I created a 15-item Self-Control Efficacy Scale (α = .946). I adapted Manstead and 
Eekelen’s (1998) perceived behavioral control phrases (“Whether or not I can… is completely 
up to me,” “There’s a lot I can do to be sure that I…,” and “How confident are you that you 
can…?”) to various ways of thinking about self-control: “continue to perform mentally 
strenuous activities,” “override impulses,” “resist temptations,” “stay focused on a goal over 
time,” and “concentrate mental energy on effortful tasks.” Participants indicated their 
agreement on a 6-point scale from 1 (disagree) to 6 (agree) for items in the first two formats 
and on a 6-point scale from 1 (very doubtful) to 7 (very confident) for the last. 
 Ideal Self and Ought Self. Finally, to assess the extent to which participants felt that 
they were close to their “ideal self” and “ought self,” I adapted Aron, Aron, & Smollan’s 
Inclusion of Other in Self (1992) scale. The Inclusion of Other is Self scale is one item which 
portrays 7 images of two increasingly overlapping circles, labeled as “Self” and, in this case 
“Ideal Self”—with the instructions describing this as the type of person you hope, wish, or 
aspire to be. In the case of “Ought Self,” the instructions describe this as the type of person it is 
your duty, obligation, or responsibility to be. Participants chose the image that represented 
their current relationship with their ideal/ought selves. This could be seen as a complement to 
the Regulatory Focus scale as it taps into progress towards promotion-focused goals and 
prevention-focused goals respectively. 
 Working Memory. After the scales relevant to potential mechanisms, both online 
questionnaires were concluded by a task of Working Memory Capacity (Oberauer, Sub, 
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Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000). Working memory has frequently been linked to self-
regulation (e.g., Hofmann, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008, Kane & Engle, 2003), 
e.g., as a mediator of the effects of glucose on self-control performance (Denson et al., 2011) 
and thus, was included for exploratory purposes as a potential mechanism. This particular task 
(from Hofmann et al., 2008) involves indicating whether a series of simple mathematical 
equations (e.g. 3 + 5 = 7) are “true” or “false,” while memorizing their one-digit results, and at 
the end of a series, reciting them. Through the ten trials, the number of equations in the series 
increases from four to eight.  
 Chronic Individual Difference Measures (Time 1 only). In the baseline questionnaire 
participants also completed the Regulatory Mode scale (Kruglanski et al., 2000), the 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001) and its composite (Haws, Dholakia, & 
Bearden, 2009), the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1991), and the Behavior 
Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Additional information about these scales is 
provided in Table 1. 
 Additional Time 2 Measures. In the post-practice questionnaire only, I included 19 
items asking participants about their experiences during the practice period and 14 items about 
their expectations for the upcoming lab session. All items about the overall practice period 
experience were on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree): 6 
items related to perceived difficulty and demand, similar to Muraven’s (2010a, 2010b) daily 
questionnaire items, e.g., “Practicing was effortful,” “Practicing required overriding an 
impulse”, 8 items related to perceived value and instrumentality, e.g., “I was really invested in 
doing the practice tasks,” “Practicing got me energized to work hard on other demanding 
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tasks”, and 5 items related to personal performance, including general items, e.g., “I did well at 
the practice tasks”, and trajectory-related items, e.g., “I got worse at the practice tasks”. 
 Fourteen items about the upcoming lab session were also on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). For each task (Stroop, Anagram), 
participants completed items related to task value and self-efficacy. For each task, 4 items were 
related to task value (e.g., “It is important to me to do my best on this task”) and 3 items were 
related to task self-efficacy or expectations (e.g., “I am uncertain that I can respond quickly 
and accurately”).  
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Results 
Compliance  
 There are two methods we can use to assess participant compliance—the number of 
daily reports completed and the percentage of participants who indicated in their daily reports 
that they did their assigned practice task. Of the 109 participants who completed the study, 
89% sent in a daily practice report for at least 8 days of the practice period. The mean 
reporting-compliance was 12.06 days, and median and mode were both 14 days. There was a 
marginal main effect of condition on compliance, F (2, 105) = 2.840, p = .063.
4
 Tukey post-
hoc comparisons of the three groups indicate that participants in the math condition (M = 
11.06, SD = 3.90) completed fewer daily reports than those in the sweets condition (M = 12.89, 
SD = 2.19), p = .049. No other contrasts were significant: participants in the diary condition (M 
= 11.92, SD = 3.46) were statistically equivalent to those in the sweets, p = .416, and math 
conditions, p = .498.   
 Of the 109 participants, 80.7% indicated that they did their assigned practice task for 8 
or more days (M = 11.09 days, Mdn = 13, Mode = 14). There was a significant effect of 
condition on the number of days of practice, F (2, 106) = 4.593, p = .012.
5
 The same pattern of 
contrasts emerged as for completing the daily reports: Tukey post-hoc comparisons indicated 
that participants in the math condition (M = 9.75, SD = 4.27) practiced fewer days than those in 
the sweets condition (M = 12.33, SD = 2.54), p = .009. No other contrasts were significant: 
participants in the diary condition (M = 11.19, SD = 3.84) were statistically equivalent to those 
in the sweets, p = .372, and math conditions, p = .211.   
                                                          
4
 Note that when using the exclusion of one univariate outlier on the Stroop measure, as in the remainder of 
analyses, this effect was only trending, F (2, 105) = 2.224, p = .113. 
5
 Note that when using the exclusion of one univariate outlier on the Stroop measure, as in the remainder of 
analyses, this effect was still significant, F (2, 105) = 3.861, p = .024. 
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Primary Analyses 
 Self-control performance was assessed pre- and post- practice using a Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) and a multiple-solution anagram task. Data from the 109 participants who 
completed the study were screened for skew, kurtosis, and univariate outliers. At both sessions, 
all 3 lab measures were found to be normally distributed. Due to a technical error, there was 
missing data for one participant’s initial Stroop score and another participant’s post-practice 
Stroop score. Additionally, one participant was excluded based on a post-practice Stroop error 
rate of 17.9%, more than three standard deviations above the mean. This left 108 participants 
for analysis. For descriptive statistics, see Table 2. 
 Baseline Measures of Self-Control (Time 1, Pre-Practice).  
 Stroop Performance. As expected, prior to assignment to practice conditions, a one-
way ANOVA on Stroop RT interference confirmed that there were no significant baseline 
differences by condition, F (2, 104) = 2.130, p = .124 and no contrasts were significant: sweets 
condition (M = 0.051, SD = 0.046), math condition (M = 0.075, 95%, SD = 0.056), and diary 
condition (M = 0.064, SD = 0.046). 
 Anagram Persistence and Performance. Also as expected, participants’ baseline 
scores for anagram persistence (in seconds) did not differ by condition: F (2, 105) = 0.278, p = 
.758: sweets condition (M = 338.79, SD = 278.30), math condition (M = 294.17, SD = 222.44), 
diary condition (M = 323.63, SD = 263.26). Likewise, there were no significant condition 
differences for baseline anagram performance, in number of correct solutions: F (2, 105) = 
1.039, p = .357: sweets condition (M = 12.72, SD = 6.20), math condition (M = 15.23, SD = 
7.26), diary condition (M = 14.08, SD = 8.36).  
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 Post-Practice Measures of Self-Control. See Table 3 for descriptive statistics for all 
Time 2 lab measures by condition. 
 Stroop Performance. A one-way ANOVA on Time 2 Stroop interference scores 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F (2, 104) = 3.150, p = .047. Tukey post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that participants in the sweets condition (M = 0.039, SD = 0.037) had 
reduced interference (i.e., better performance) compared to the math condition (M = 0.061, SD 
= 0.034), p = .037, but did not differ from the diary condition (M = 0.048, SD = 0.048), p 
=.509. Likewise, the math and diary conditions did not significantly differ, p = .331. 
 When controlling for Time 1 Stroop scores, the main effect of condition became 
marginally significant, F (2, 102) = 2.216, p = .114. However, the pattern of contrasts remained 
the same. Participants in the sweets condition (M = 0.042, SD = 0.033) had reduced 
interference relative to the math condition (M = 0.058, SD = 0.033), p = .046, and were no 
different than those in the diary condition (M = 0.046, SD = 0.033), p = .597. Again, the math 
and diary conditions did not significantly differ, p = .129.  
 To directly examine the role of time, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 103) = 11.028, p = .001, such that 
participants showed reduced interference on the Stroop task after the two-week practice period 
(M = 0.048, SD = 0.036) relative to baseline (M = 0.064, SD = 0.049). There was also a 
significant effect of condition averaging across both times, F (2, 103) = 3.492, p = .034: sweets 
condition (M = 0.046, SD = 0.031), math condition (M = 0.068, SD = 0.035), and diary 
condition (M = 0.055, SD = 0.035). However, despite the pattern observed above, there was no 
interaction between time and condition, F (2, 103) = 0.060, p = .942.   
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 Anagram Persistence. Differences by condition in the anagram task were analyzed 
using standardized scores since a different set of letters was used for each session. For ease of 
interpretation, however, descriptives are provided in the original units (seconds). A one-way 
ANOVA examining Time 2 persistence was not significant, controlling for Time 1 persistence, 
F (2, 104) = 0.007, p = .993, or without controlling for Time 1 persistence, F (2, 105) = 0.159, 
p = .853 (sweets condition, M = 392.16, SD = 233.73, math condition, M = 359.47, SD = 
268.49, diary condition, M = 380.69, SD = 239.53). A repeated measures ANOVA on the 
standardized scores revealed no effect of time, F (1, 105) < 0.001, p = .983, no effect of 
condition, F (2, 105) = 0.263, p = .769, and no interaction, F (1, 105) = 0.022, p = .979. 
 Anagram Performance. The results examining standardized anagram performance 
scores were parallel: a one-way ANOVA on the number of correct solutions at Time 2 was not 
significant, controlling for Time 1 persistence, F (2, 104) = 0.245, p = .783, or without 
controlling for Time 1 persistence, F (2, 105) = 0.500, p = .608: sweets condition (M = 24.81, 
SD = 11.45), math condition (M = 26.91, SD = 10.51), diary condition (M = 24.65, SD = 
10.00). A repeated measure ANOVA on standardized scores revealed no effect of time, F (1, 
105) = 0.027, p = .871, no effect of condition, F (2, 105) = 0.003, p = .953, and no interaction, 
F (2, 105) = 0.393, p = .676. 
Examining Possible Mechanisms of Self-Control Performance and Improvement 
 As noted in the introduction, a subset of the scales included in the online questionnaires 
will be the focus of the current analyses: general self-efficacy, self-control value, self-control 
instrumentality, self-control self-efficacy, limited resource beliefs (both about the ability to 
continue mental activity and to continue resisting temptation), trait self-control ability, and 
self-esteem. In addition to the possible mechanisms highlighted in the introduction, I included 
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trait self-control and self-esteem in the analyses below, two relatively stable individual 
difference measures that have been strongly related to self-control performance in past research 
(Tangney et al., 2004; Judge, Bono, & Thoreson, 2002). 
 Baseline Questionnaire Measures. One-way ANOVAs on each of these measures at 
baseline confirmed that most measures were no different by condition; however, there was a 
failure of random assignment with regards to limited resources beliefs—specifically, there 
were differences by condition on implicit beliefs about the ability to continue resisting 
temptations: F (2, 105) = 5.779, p = .004. Tukey post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants in the sweets condition (M = 3.907, SD = 0.927) and diary condition (M = 4.108, 
SD = 0.916) had more unlimited theories (e.g., “If you have just resisted a temptation, you feel 
strengthened and can withstand any new temptations”) than those in the math condition (M = 
3.376, SD = 0.977), p = .050 and p = .004 respectively. Participants in the sweets and diary 
conditions did not differ from each other, p = .364. When controlling for initial implicit beliefs 
about temptation, the effect of time on Stroop interference was no longer significant, F (1, 102) 
= 0.580, p = .448, but critically, the effect of condition remained, F (2, 102) = 3.872, p = .024; 
there was no interaction, F (2, 102) = 0.001, p = .980. 
 Post-Practice Questionnaire Measures.
6
  
 General self-efficacy. A repeated-measures ANOVA on the New General Self-Efficacy 
Scale revealed no significant effect of time, F (1, 104) = 2.045, p = .156, or condition, F (2, 
104) = 1.787, p = .173. There was no interaction, F (2, 104) = 0.052, p = .949.
7
 
 Self-control value. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed marginally reduced 
endorsement of beliefs that self-control is valuable at Time 2, F (1, 104) = 3.884, p = .051 
                                                          
6
 One-way ANOVAs controlling for Time 1 scores show a similar pattern of results. 
7
 When including only participants who practiced greater than 7 days, however, general self-efficacy did increase 
significantly, F (1, 85) = 4.717, p = .033 (MTime1 = 3.66, SD = 0.57; MTime2 = 3.75, SD = 0.56). 
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(MTime1 = 5.036, SD = 0.515; MTime2 = 4.93, SD = 0.59). This decrease did not differ by 
condition F (2, 104) = 1.698, p = .188, nor was there an interaction, F (2, 104) = 1.069, p = 
.347. 
 Self-control instrumentality. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed marginally 
reduced endorsement of beliefs in the instrumentality of self-control at Time 2, F (1, 104) = 
3.428, p = .067 (MTime1 = 4.88, SD = 0.67; MTime2 = 4.74, SD = 0.72). This decrease did not 
differ by condition F (2, 104) = 0.464, p = .630, nor was there an interaction, F (2, 104) = 
0.124, p = .883. 
 Self-control efficacy. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant effect of 
time, F (1, 104) = 0.002, p = .966, or condition, F (2, 104) = 0.628, p = .536. There was no 
interaction, F (2, 104) = 0.605, p = .548.
8
 
 Limited resource beliefs. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that belief in the 
ability to continue mental activity increased over time, F (1, 104) = 4.759, p = .031 (MTime1 = 
2.72, SD = 0.86; MTime2 = 2.88, SD = 0.86), but did not differ by condition, F (2, 104) = 0.103, 
p = .902; nor was there an interaction, F (2, 104) = 0.255, p = .775. Belief in the ability to 
continue resisting temptation did not increase uniformly over time, F (1, 104) = 0.546, p = 
.462, but there was a main effect of condition, F (2, 104) = 3.620, p = .030, and a significant 
interaction, F (2, 104) = 4.425, p = .014, such that participants in the math condition had 
significantly more unlimited theories at Time 2, F (1, 33) = 6.125, p = .019, (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.09); those in the sweets condition remained the same, F (1, 35) = 1.271, p = .267, (M = 4.08, 
SD = 0.85); and those in the diary condition had marginally reduced unlimited theories F (1, 
36) = 3.339, p = .076, (M = 3.83, SD = 0.98). See Figure 1.  
                                                          
8
 For the subscale relating specifically to resisting temptation, however, (e.g., “Whether or not I can resist 
temptations is completely up to me”), there was a marginal interaction:  F (2, 104) = 2.569, p = .081. 
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 Trait self-control. A repeated-measures ANOVA on trait self-control revealed no 
significant effect of time, F (1, 104) = 0.381, p = .538, or condition, F (2, 104) = 1.167, p = 
.315. There was no interaction, F (2, 104) = 0.222, p = .801. 
 Self-esteem. Finally, a repeated-measures ANOVA on self-esteem also revealed a 
marginal decrease over time, F (1, 104) = 3.371, p = .069 (MTime1 = 3.25, SD = 1.12; MTime2 = 
3.17, SD = 1.09). This decrease did not differ by condition F (2, 104) = 0.252, p = .778, nor 
was there an interaction, F (2, 104) = 0.736, p = .481. 
What predicts baseline self-control performance? 
 Given that relatively few post-practice condition differences were observed in the 
analyses above, I was interested in examining whether scores on any of the candidate mediator 
scales measured in the initial online session predicted pre-practice self-control performance 
(initial lab session).
9
 
 Stroop Task. Time 1 Stroop performance was regressed on the eight potential mediator 
variables listed above. There were no significant predictors of Stroop performance, although 
there was a non-significant trend for self-control instrumentality to predict performance, B = -
0.012, SE = 0.008, t (98) = -1.423, p = .158. See Table 4.  
Anagram Persistence and Performance. Time 1 anagram persistence was regressed 
on the eight potential mediator variables listed above; only self-control instrumentality 
emerged as a significant predictor: B = 87.06, SE = 39.70, t (99) = 2.193, p = .031. Likewise, 
self-control instrumentality was the only significant predictor of anagram performance: B = 
2.35, SE = 1.15, t (99) = 2.047, p = .043. See Tables 5 and 6.  
  
                                                          
9
 Investigations of candidate mediator scales predicting self-control performance at Time 2, as well as changes in 
these scales predicting Time 2 self-control performance and change in self-control performance, are of course of 
strong interest and will be pursued in future analyses of this dataset. 
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Discussion 
Self-Control Performance 
 In this study, I partially replicated past findings that practicing self-control can lead to 
improvement in self-control performance (Muraven, 2010a), using a larger sample than has 
been used in much prior work. Participants in the self-control practice (avoiding sweets) 
condition showed reduced interference on the Stroop task after two weeks of self-control 
practice relative to participants in the math control condition, but not relative to participants in 
the self-control diary control condition. This effect was present, though weaker, controlling for 
Time 1 Stroop performance, and there was no significant time x condition interaction; thus, 
there was not strong evidence of a change in Stroop performance from Time 1 to Time 2 for 
participants in the self-control practice condition. Furthermore, participants in this condition 
did not persist longer or perform better on a self-control task (anagram task) after depletion. 
The current study thus provides partial support for the idea that self-control practice may 
improve self-control performance, as assessed by the pre-depletion or “capacity” measure but 
not by the post-depletion or “endurance” measure.  
Interpreting the Stroop Effects. One possible explanation for the pattern of Stroop 
results is that the effects were driven by differences in compliance across conditions. Perhaps 
all tasks led to improved self-control performance but did so less for participants in the math 
condition, who complied significantly less. While possible, I think this is unlikely the full 
story, given that compliance in the current study (~11 days out of 14) was high relative to 
studies in the self-control practice literature (on par with a mean of 11.68 days in Muraven 
(2010a)); even compliance in the math conditions (about 10 days) was high relative to other 
work (e.g., Sultan et al., 2012). However, when controlling for compliance in the model, the 
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main effect of condition did drop in significance (from p = .034 to p = .080). This suggests that 
it will be important to explore in future analyses how compliance with and engagement in the 
practice task may be an important factor in understanding self-control practice effects.  
 Notably, the Stroop performance of participants in the self-control diary condition did 
not significantly differ from either the avoiding sweets or math problems conditions. It is 
possible (and likely) that the self-control diary condition was more demanding than in previous 
work (Muraven, 2010a) given the modifications I made. Indeed, the self-control diary was 
rated as the most “demanding” condition overall. According to the strength model, relatively 
high or low difficulty should be irrelevant to self-control improvement, as long as completing 
the diary does not require overriding an impulse. If, however, difficulty or perceived difficulty 
is playing an important role (which we saw a hint of in Hui et al., 2009), it is possible that this 
helps to account for the current finding.  
It is also possible that given the increased demands of the diary used in the current 
study, completing the diary did require overriding an impulse. It is interesting to note that in 
the original demonstration of self-control practice effects, a diary condition did serve as a self-
control practice task; the authors noted that “the keeping of the diary was the exercise in self-
regulation” (Muraven et al., 1999; p. 450). It becomes clear that designing appropriate control 
conditions that are equivalent in difficulty but do not require self-control is a challenging task. 
It could be argued (as in fact one participant pointed out) that completing the self-control diary 
in itself requires overriding the temptation to quit– not unlike my argument for why persisting 
on the anagram task is an appropriate measure of self-control. Future analyses will allow me to 
examine more directly if participants’ daily experiences, as recorded in the self-control diary, 
relate in any systematic ways to self-control performance. 
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 Interpreting the Anagram Effects. As discussed above, I did not find any evidence of 
a self-control practice effect on the post-depletion anagram task, my measure of self-control 
“endurance.” Prior work has shown effects on both capacity and endurance measures, but there 
are not yet clear grounds for determining a priori which effect will emerge more strongly. A 
potentially significant limitation of the current study is that the anagram task administered at 
Time 2 may have been inadvertently easier than the anagram task administered at Time 1. For 
this reason, I analyzed anagram performance and persistence using Z-scores, but this limits my 
ability to most sensitively detect changes in performance by condition (unless there are rank-
order changes in performance). In an on-going follow-up study, I am comparing mean 
persistence and performance in the two anagram tasks at baseline to assess whether the Time 2 
anagram task was in fact easier or whether the effect on Time 2 raw scores is a real effect of 
time. If so, it could suggest that doing a demanding practice task for two weeks, regardless of 
whether it specifically requires overriding an impulse, improves self-control performance.
10
 
Potential Mechanism of Self-Control Improvement: Value, Expectations, and Beliefs 
 In addition to improvements in self-control performance in the avoiding sweets 
condition relative to controls, I predicted that the improvements would be mediated by 
motivational changes (e.g., increased value of self-control, increased self-efficacy in the 
domain of self-control). For the key mechanisms analyzed in this paper, however, I found no 
evidence of the expected changes by condition. However, a few interesting patterns emerged 
when examining overall changes in these scales over time, and in examining their predictive 
power for self-control performance at Time 1. 
                                                          
10
 It could also be a learning effect or an effect of time, of course. If the follow-up study reveals no difference in 
performance between the two tasks at baseline, I will conduct a second follow-up study to rule out the 
alternative possibility that any improvement was due simply to the effect of time. 
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 Changes Over Time. I found a main effect of time on some of the proposed 
mechanism scales, such that implicit theories about the ability to continue mental exertion 
increased post-practice (i.e. more unlimited theories); and self-control value, self-control 
instrumentality, and self-esteem marginally decreased post-practice. The change in implicit 
theories, though not stronger in the avoiding-sweets condition relative to controls, was in the 
expected direction. The decrements on the other measures, however, are not as readily 
explained. One explanation for the unexpected findings is that they were incidental effects: the 
post-practice measure occurred later in the academic term, when increased stress and distress 
from examinations are commonly high (Oaten & Cheng, 2006a; Job et al., 2010); thus, it is 
possible that participants were frustrated with self-regulatory efforts at the time and the effect 
was entirely due to external circumstances.  
 The observed reductions in self-control value and instrumentality may also have been a 
result of the study itself: regularly practicing a task you believe to be an exercise of self-
control, regardless of condition, could have had a number of effects. For example, it is possible 
that in the initial online session, participants thought about items like “self-control pays off” 
(self-control value) and “self-control will improve my performance at school” (self-control 
instrumentality) more abstractly, or even with some degree of positive illusions, given their 
“implemental mindset” as they began the study (Taylor & Brown, 1994; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 
1995). However, after two weeks of exposure to the practice task and increased awareness of 
self-control in general, they may have responded more soberly (or accurately). Another 
possibility is that participants did not feel that they performed well in their practice tasks and 
were not impressed, as I had hoped, by the notion that “such simple adjustments are possible 
and worthwhile.” The reports of overall practice experience (means for “I cared about doing 
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my best on the practice tasks” and “I did well at the practice tasks” both approximate “neither 
agree nor disagree”) and the marginal decrease in self-esteem are consistent with this 
interpretation.   
 Though more speculative, one further conjecture is worth noting: it seems possible that 
for many people, regular reflection on self-control performance, in itself, may actually hinder 
positive views of self and self-control. This is consistent with the marginal decreases in self-
control value, instrumentality, and self-esteem discussed; and consistent, assuming the salience 
of self-control performance is strongest in the diary condition, with a number of other 
observations: (1) Though non-significant, the marginal decrease in each of these three variables 
was more pronounced in the diary condition; (2) The item “self-control will improve my self-
esteem,” found to be driving the decrease in perceived instrumentality, decreased only in the 
diary condition (trending interaction); (3) While self-efficacy for resisting temptations 
increased in the sweets condition, it decreased in the diary condition (marginal interaction); 
and (4) While implicit theories about the ability to continue resisting temptation increased in 
the sweets and math conditions, they decreased in the diary condition (significant interaction; 
also when including overall perceived performance as a covariate).  
 Still, this evidence should be taken with caution. In particular, it is important to 
consider the moderating role of the valence of perceptions of personal performance: reflecting 
on daily self-control successes versus failures may likely have different outcomes. The 
marginal decreases in perceived value and self-esteem could be an artifact of heightened 
salience of self-control failures and struggles (as it appears in my study), not reflection in itself. 
Fortunately, I will be able to better disentangle these issues in future planned analyses of the 
content of the self-control diaries; the diaries will provide a rich source of data on how these 
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perceptions may have shifted over time. I will investigate, for example, whether generally 
positive outcomes (higher ratings on “How successful were you?”) or the perceived ease of 
attaining those outcomes (lower ratings on “How much did you work to resist temptation?”) 
are predictive of overall perceived value at Time 2, or even of the measures of self-control 
performance. 
 Mechanisms of Self-Control Improvement. The initial set of analyses on potential 
mechanisms of self-control improvement was not promising. Self-control practice type was not 
related to increases in self-control value, instrumentality, or self-efficacy. This could mean, as 
the strength model would argue, that these proposed mechanisms are not the routes by which 
self-control practice has its effects. However, given that I did not strongly or fully replicate the 
prior work on the effects of self-control practice on self-control performance (e.g., Muraven et 
al., 1999, Muraven, 2010a, Muraven, 2010b) these null effects should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
 Further, as acknowledged earlier, the current analyses are by no means exhaustive. It is 
possible, for instance, that although self-control practice does not predict differences in the 
levels of these mechanisms at Time 2, it does predict changes in these mechanisms over time. 
These changes may be linked to self-control performance. It is also possible that self-control 
practice predicts changes in the relationships between these proposed mechanisms and self-
control performance. For instance, perhaps practice does not change how much participants 
value self-control, but does change how the value of self-control is linked to self-control 
performance (e.g., becoming more tightly coupled). There are also a number of important 
measures not reported in the current analyses (e.g., working memory), as well as potentially 
significant moderators for the practice effect itself. For instance, it may be that self-control 
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practice is most effective for certain types of individuals (e.g., people low in 
conscientiousness) and that when I consider such factors, a different story about mechanisms 
will emerge.  
 There are also a number of ways that the current study could be extended. For one, 
other operationalizations of the same constructs might be explored that could perhaps better 
detect changes; many of the primary suggested mechanism scales were an initial formulation 
and not yet validated. It is even possible that many of the suggested mechanisms (e.g., affective 
evaluations of self-control and self-control self-efficacy) are not best measured through explicit 
endorsements at all. A number of studies have shown that goals can be initiated and completed 
entirely outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Trötschel, 2001); it is generally agreed that much of goal-related behavior occurs without 
awareness (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Ferguson, 2007). Finally, recall that for consistency with 
previous work (Muraven, 2010a), I explicitly told participants that the practice tasks should 
help build self-control: to determine generalizability, future work on mechanisms may benefit 
from creating a cover story that does not make self-control improvement salient.  
 Predicting Performance at Time 1. It is interesting to reflect on the analyses I 
conducted to examine the relation between initial measurement of these mechanism scales and 
self-control performance prior to the practice period. Self-control instrumentality, or the 
perceived perception of self-control as a means to important personal outcomes, emerged as 
the best predictor of self-control performance. This lends support for the motivational 
argument, especially given that these beliefs were a stronger predictor than trait self-control 
ability, an individual difference measure that is often related to self-control performance 
(Tangney et al., 2004; de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012). 
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Self-control instrumentality may, then, still be a strong candidate for a mechanism of self-
control improvement.  
One observation that appears consistent with this argument is the counter-effectiveness 
of a relatively difficult practice condition included in the original demonstration of self-control 
practice effects (Muraven et al., 1999). To test the range of self-control practice effects, 
Muraven and colleagues included a condition of overriding a dominant emotional response: 
participants were instructed to improve their emotional states as often as possible and keep a 
diary of their progress. They found that participants in this condition actually performed 
significantly worse in a post-depletion self-control handgrip task. One suggestion the authors 
made was that participants may have struggled unsuccessfully to improve their mood, relative 
to the more concrete and attainable goals of adjusting posture and keeping a diary. Repeated 
pairing of self-control attempts with a lack of success may have decreased perceived 
instrumentality and thereby undermined self-control performance. Given the potential 
importance of this mechanism, it may also be worth exploring other operationalizations of this 
concept. In a model of perceived control, Skinner, Chapman, and Baltes (1988) identify three 
independent beliefs that contribute to goal-directed behavior: agency (the perceived link from 
agent to means), means-ends (the perceived link from those means to outcomes), and control 
(the perceived link from agent to outcomes overall). The predictive power of my measure of 
instrumentality suggests the importance of means-ends beliefs for the effective exercise of self-
control. 
Implications and Future Directions 
 At this point, the current study provides more questions than answers about the extent 
to which self-control performance can be improved and how it operates. As discussed, the 
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performance effects were not fully consistent with the strength model and the potential 
mechanism effects were, therefore, more difficult to interpret. This work, however, did 
highlight key challenges for research on practice effects, such as controlling for difficulty, and 
identified promising areas for further study, such as limited resource beliefs and self-control 
instrumentality. 
 A trade-off of using a longitudinal design is reduced control: I did not attempt to 
directly manipulate my main predictors of interest. Thus, refining a new design for the kind of 
large-scale study described above may benefit from first probing hypotheses of the 
motivational model in the context of more controlled experimental designs. In one planned 
study, for example, I will build on previous research highlighting the independent contributions 
of the value of self-control performance (e.g., Muraven & Slessareva, 2003, Job et al., 2010) 
and expectations for self-control performance (e.g., Martijn et al., 2002, Clarkson et al., 2010) 
by directly manipulating both. This study will directly speak to one of the challenges faced by 
those arguing for a motivational approach to understanding self-control: strength model 
proponents argue that while motivational factors can restore performance in the short-term, 
limits to self-control performance will eventually be felt and observed in performance down 
the line (Muraven et al., 2006; Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012). Thus, in a series of 
three demanding self-control tasks, participants will be randomly assigned to a high or low 
value condition (receiving a monetary incentive for performance or not) and a high or low 
expectations condition (feedback that a depleting task has or has not shown to be depleting in 
the past). I believe that participants will be able to persist across all three tasks, but only when 
both value and expectations are perceived as high. Similar kinds of manipulations could 
conceivably be applied to a more longitudinal study as well; for example, participants could be 
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given false information about whether practice tasks were or were not shown to help build self-
control in past work.  
 Further exploration of the role of values, expectations, and beliefs, in both experimental 
and longitudinal designs, is critical for an understanding of how self-control operates. The 
potential that this line of research presents can only be realized if we know the mechanisms by 
which practice effects function and the situations to which they generalize. If, for example, 
means-ends beliefs play a strong role in the mechanism of self-control, it will be critical to 
design interventions that focus more on helping participants to build those associations, rather 
than interventions that focus on building ability per se. Ultimately, these applications have 
important implications that may help us to more effectively address the pervasive problems of 
self-control failure. 
  
 
 
43 
 
References 
Ackerman, J. M., Goldstein, N. J., Shapiro, J. R., & Bargh, J. A. (2009). You wear me out: The 
vicarious depletion of self-control. Psychological Science, 20(3), 326–332. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02290.x 
Alberts, H. J. E. M., Martijn, C., & De Vries, N. K. (2011). Fighting self-control failure: 
Overcoming ego depletion by increasing self-awareness. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 47(1), 58–62. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.08.004 
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the structure 
of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 596-612. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596 
Atkinson, J. W., & Feather, N. T. (1966). A theory of achievement motivation. New York, NY: 
Wiley.  
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The 
automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6), 1014-1027. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.1014 
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing control: How and why people 
fail at self-regulation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Heatherton, T. F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview. Psychological 
Inquiry, 7(1), 1–15. doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0701_1 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active 
self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 1252-1265. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252. 
 
 
44 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (2000). Ego depletion: A resource model of 
volition, self-regulation, and controlled processing. Social Cognition, 18(2), 130–150. 
doi:10.1521/soco.2000.18.2.130 
Baumeister, Roy F., Gailliot, M., DeWall, C. N., & Oaten, M. (2006). Self-regulation and 
personality: How interventions increase regulatory success, and how depletion moderates the 
effects of traits on behavior. Journal of Personality, 74(6), 1773–1802. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6494.2006.00428.x 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-control. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 16(6), 351–355. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00534.x 
Boucher, H. C., & Kofos, M. N. (2012). The idea of money counteracts ego depletion effects. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(4), 804–810. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2011.03.031 
Cervone, D. (2000). Thinking about self-efficacy. Behavior Modification, 24(1), 30–56. 
doi:10.1177/0145445500241002 
Chen, G., Gully, S. M., & Eden, D. (2001). Validation of a new general self-efficacy scale. 
Organizational Research Methods, 4(1), 62–83. doi:10.1177/109442810141004 
Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories of personality. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(1), 19. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.19 
Clarkson, J. J., Hirt, E. R., Jia, L., & Alexander, M. B. (2010). When perception is more than 
reality: The effects of perceived versus actual resource depletion on self-regulatory behavior. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(1), 29-46. doi:10.1037/a0017539 
Craig, A. R., Franklin, J. A., & Andrews, G. (1984). A scale to measure locus of control of 
behaviour. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 57(2), 173–180. doi:10.1111/j.2044-
8341.1984.tb01597.x 
 
 
45 
 
de Ridder, D. T., Lensvelt-Mulders, G., Finkenauer, C., Stok, F. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2012). 
Taking stock of self-control: A meta-analysis of how trait self-control relates to a wide range of 
behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16(1), 76–99. 
doi:10.1177/1088868311418749 
Denson, T. F., Capper, M. M., Oaten, M., Friese, M., & Schofield, T. P. (2011). Self-control 
training decreases aggression in response to provocation in aggressive individuals. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 45(2), 252–256. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2011.02.001 
Duckworth, A. L. (2011). The significance of self-control. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 108(7), 2639–2640. doi:10.1073/pnas.1019725108 
Dvorak, R. D., & Simons, J. S. (2009). Moderation of resource depletion in the self-control strength 
model: Differing effects of two modes of self-control. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 35(5), 572–583. doi:10.1177/0146167208330855 
Dweck, C.S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality and development. 
Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis. 
Elfhag, K., & Morey, L. C. (2008). Personality traits and eating behavior in the obese: Poor self-
control in emotional and external eating but personality assets in restrained eating. Eating 
Behaviors, 9(3), 285–293. doi:10.1016/j.eatbeh.2007.10.003 
Ferguson, M. J. (2007). On the automatic evaluation of end-states. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 92(4), 596-611. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.596 
Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Liking is for doing: the effects of goal pursuit on automatic 
evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(5), 557. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.87.5.557 
 
 
46 
 
Finkel, E. J., DeWall, C. N., Slotter, E. B., Oaten, M., & Foshee, V. A. (2009). Self-regulatory 
failure and intimate partner violence perpetration. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 97(3), 483-499. doi:10.1037/a0015433 
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of impulses. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(4), 352–366. doi:10.1177/1088868311411165 
Gailliot, M. T., Plant, E. A., Butz, D. A., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007a). Increasing self-regulatory 
strength can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing stereotypes. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 33(2), 281–294. doi:10.1177/0146167206296101 
Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., Nathan, C., Maner, J. K., Ashby, E., Tice, D. M., Schmeichel, B. 
J. (2007b). Self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is more than a 
metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(2), 325–336. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.92.2.325 
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2010). Ego depletion and the 
strength model of self-control: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136(4), 495-525. 
doi:10.1037/a0019486 
Haws, K. L., Dholakia, U. M., Bearden, W. O. (2009). An assessment of chronic regulatory focus 
measures. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(5), 967-982. doi:10.1509/jmkr.47.5.967 
Hofmann, W., Gschwendner, T., Friese, M., Wiers, R. W., & Schmitt, M. (2008). Working memory 
capacity and self-regulatory behavior: Toward an individual differences perspective on 
behavior determination by automatic versus controlled processes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 95(4), 962-977. doi:10.1037/a0012705 
 
 
47 
 
Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., -S, M., & Wan, W. (1999). Implicit theories, attributions, and 
coping: A meaning system approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(3), 
588–599. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.3.588 
Higgins, E. T., Friedman, R. S., Harlow, R. E., Idson, L. C., Ayduk, O. N., & Taylor, A. (2001). 
Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success: Promotion pride versus 
prevention pride. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(1), 3–23. doi:10.1002/ejsp.27 
Hui, S. A., Wright, R. A., Stewart, C. C., Simmons, A., Eaton, B., & Nolte, R. N. (2009). 
Performance, cardiovascular, and health behavior effects of an inhibitory strength training 
intervention. Motivation and Emotion, 33(4), 419–434. doi:10.1007/s11031-009-9146-0 
Inzlicht, M., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2012). What is ego depletion? Toward a mechanistic revision of 
the resource model of self-control. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(5), 450–463. 
doi:10.1177/1745691612454134 
Job, V., Dweck, C. S., & Walton, G. M. (2010). Ego depletion-is it all in your head? Implicit 
theories about willpower affect self-regulation. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1686–1693. 
doi:10.1177/0956797610384745 
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and 
theoretical perspectives. Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2, 102–138. 
Judge, T. A., Erez, A., Bono, J. E., & Thoresen, C. J. (2002). Are measures of self-esteem, 
neuroticism, locus of control, and generalized self-efficacy indicators of a common core 
construct? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 693-710. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.83.3.693 
 
 
48 
 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working-memory capacity and the control of attention: The 
contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to Stroop interference. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 132(1), 47–70. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.132.1.47 
Khan, A. I., Vasquez, Y., Gray, J., Jr, F. H. W., & Kroll, M. H. (2009). The variability of results 
between point-of-care testing glucose meters and the central laboratory analyzer. Archives of 
Pathology & Laboratory Medicine, 130(10), 1527-1532. 
Kruglanski, A.W., Thompson, E. P., Higgins, E. T., Atash, M. N., Pierro, A., Shah, J. Y., & Spiegel, 
S. (2000). To ‘‘do the right thing’’ or to ‘‘just do it’’: Locomotion and assessment as distinct 
self-regulatory imperatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 793–815. 
doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2011.03.031 
Kruglanski, A. W., Bélanger, J. J., Chen, X., Köpetz, C., Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L. (2012). The 
energetics of motivated cognition: A force-field analysis. Psychological Review, 119(1), 1-20. 
doi:10.1037/a0025488 
Kurzban, R. (2010). Does the brain consume additional glucose during self-control tasks? 
Evolutionary Psychology: An International Journal of Evolutionary Approaches to Psychology 
and Behavior, 8(2), 244-259. 
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children’s intrinsic interest with 
extrinsic reward: A test of the“ overjustification” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 28(1), 129-137. doi:10.1037/h0035519 
Manstead, A. S., & Eekelen, S. A. (1998). Distinguishing between perceived behavioral control and 
self-efficacy in the domain of academic achievement intentions and behaviors. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 28(15), 1375–1392. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1998.tb01682.x 
 
 
49 
 
Martijn, C., Tenbült, P., Merckelbach, H., Dreezens, E., & De Vries, N. K. (2002). Getting a grip on 
ourselves: Challenging expectancies about loss of energy after self-control. Social Cognition, 
20(6), 441–460. doi:10.1521/soco.20.6.441.22978 
Mischel, W., Ebbesen, E. B., & Raskoff Zeiss, A. (1972). Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in 
delay of gratification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21(2), 204–218. 
doi:10.1037/h0032198 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Peake, P. K. (1988). The nature of adolescent competencies predicted by 
preschool delay of gratification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(4), 687-696. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.687 
Moffitt, T. E., Arseneault, L., Belsky, D., Dickson, N., Hancox, R. J., Harrington, H., & Ross, S. 
(2011). A gradient of childhood self-control predicts health, wealth, and public safety. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(7), 2693–2698. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1010076108 
Molden, D. C., Hui, C. M., Scholer, A. A., Meier, B. P., Noreen, E. E., D’Agostino, P. R., & 
Martin, V. (2012). Motivational versus metabolic effects of carbohydrates on self-control. 
Psychological Science, 23(10), 1137–1144. doi:10.1177/0956797612439069 
Moller, A. C., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Choice and ego-depletion: The moderating role of 
autonomy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(8), 1024–1036. 
doi:10.1177/0146167206288008 
Muraven, M., Baumeister, R. F., & Tice, D. M. (1999). Longitudinal improvement of self-
regulation through practice: Building self-control strength through repeated exercise. The 
Journal of Social Psychology, 139(4), 446–457. doi:10.1080/00224549909598404 
 
 
50 
 
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: Does 
self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 247–259. doi:10.1037//0033-
2909.126.2.247 
Muraven, M., Lorraine, R., & Neinhaus, K. (2002). Self-control and alcohol restraint: An initial 
application of the Self-Control Strength Model. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 16(2), 
113–120. doi:10.1037/0893-164X.16.2.113 
Muraven, M., & Slessareva, E. (2003). Mechanisms of self-control failure: Motivation and limited 
resources. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(7), 894-906. 
doi:10.1177/0146167203029007008 
Muraven, M., Shmueli, D., & Burkley, E. (2006). Conserving self-control strength. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 91(3), 524–537. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.524 
Muraven, M., Gagné, M., & Rosman, H. (2008). Helpful self-control: Autonomy support, vitality, 
and depletion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(3), 573–585. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.10.008 
Muraven, M. (2010a). Building self-control strength: Practicing self-control leads to improved self-
control performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 465–468. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.12.011 
Muraven, M. (2010b). Practicing self-control lowers the risk of smoking lapse. Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors, 24(3), 446–452. doi:10.1037/a0018545  
Oaten, M., & Cheng, K. (2006a). Improved self-control: The benefits of a regular program of 
academic study. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28(1), 1–16. 
doi:10.1207/s15324834basp2801_1 
 
 
51 
 
Oaten, M., & Cheng, K. (2006b). Longitudinal gains in self-regulation from regular physical 
exercise. British Journal of Health Psychology, 11(4), 717–733. 
doi:10.1348/135910706X96481 
Oaten, M., & Cheng, K. (2007). Improvements in self-control from financial monitoring. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 28(4), 487–501. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.11.003 
Oberauer, K., Süß, H.-M., Schulze, R., Wilhelm, O., & Wittmann, W. W. (2000). Working memory 
capacity—Facets of a cognitive ability construct. Personality and Individual Differences, 
29(6), 1017–1045. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00251-2 
Robins, R. W., Hendin, H. M., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2001). Measuring global self-esteem: 
Construct validation of a single-item measure and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(2), 151–161. doi:10.1177/0146167201272002 
Salo, R., Henik, A., & Robertson, L. C. (2001). Interpreting Stroop interference: An analysis of 
differences between task versions. Neuropsychology, 15(4), 462–471. doi:10.1037/0894-
4105.15.4.462 
Schmeichel, B. J., & Vohs, K. (2009). Self-affirmation and self-control: Affirming core values 
counteracts ego depletion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), 770-782. 
doi:10.1037/a0014635 
Sheldon, K. M., & Elliot, A. J. (1999). Goal striving, need satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: 
the self-concordance model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(3), 482-497. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.3.482 
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Peake, P. K. (1990). Predicting adolescent cognitive and self-regulatory 
competencies from preschool delay of gratification: Identifying diagnostic conditions. 
Developmental Psychology, 26(6), 978-986. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.26.6.978 
 
 
52 
 
Skinner, E. A., Chapman, M., & Baltes, P. B. (1988). Control, means-ends, and agency beliefs: A 
new conceptualization and its measurement during childhood. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 54(1), 117-133. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.117  
Skinner, N., & Brewer, N. (2002). The dynamics of threat and challenge appraisals prior to stressful 
achievement events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 678-692. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.3.678 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 18(6), 643-662. doi:10.1037/h0054651 
Sultan, A. J., Joireman, J., & Sprott, D. E. (2012). Building consumer self-control: The effect of 
self-control exercises on impulse buying urges. Marketing Letters, 23(1), 61–72. 
doi:10.1007/s11002-011-9135-4 
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control predicts good 
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of Personality, 
72(2), 271–324. doi:10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00263.x 
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1994). Positive illusions and well-being revisited: Separating fact 
from fiction. Psychological Bulletin, 116(1), 21–27. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.21 
Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69(2), 213–226. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.2.213 
Tomaka, J., Palacios, R., Schneider, K. T., Colotla, M., Concha, J. B., & Herrald, M. M. (1999). 
Assertiveness predicts threat and challenge reactions to potential stress among women. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6), 1008-1021. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.1008 
Tyler, J. M., & Burns, K. C. (2009). Triggering conservation of the self’s regulatory resources. 
Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31(3), 255–266. doi:10.1080/01973530903058490 
 
 
53 
 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they’re doing? Action 
identification and human behavior. Psychological Review, 94(1), 3-15. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.94.1.3 
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Ciarocco, N. J. (2005). Self-regulation and self-presentation: 
Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self-presentation 
depletes regulatory resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(4), 632–657. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.4.632 
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2012). Motivation, personal beliefs, and 
limited resources all contribute to self-control. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 48, 
943–947. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.03.002 
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. Oxford, England: Wiley.   
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2003). Can implementation intentions help to overcome ego-depletion? 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(3), 279–286. doi:10.1016/S0022-
1031(02)00527-9 
 
  
 
 
54 
 
Table 1 
 
Scales Included in Online Questionnaire Sessions 1 and 2 
 
Component Source Sample Item 
 
Questionnaire 1 Only  
 
  
Regulatory Mode Kruglanski et 
al., 2000 
 “I am a critical person.” (assessor score) 
 “I am a ‘go-getter.’” (locomotor score) 
Regulatory Focus  Higgins et al., 
2001 
 “Not being careful enough has gotten me into 
trouble at times.” (prevention score- R) 
& RF Composite Haws et al., 
2009 
 “I see myself as someone who is primarily 
striving to reach my ‘ideal self.’”  
(promotion score) 
Big Five Inventory John 
&Srivastava, 
1999 
(5 scores: extraversion, agreeableness, openness 
to experience, conscientiousness, neuroticism) 
Behavior Identification 
Form 
Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1987 
 Asked whether they think of behaviors, like 
“making a list,” as “getting organized or 
writing things down?” 
Questionnaire 1 and 2  
 
 
New General Self-
Efficacy Scale 
Chen et al., 
2001 
 “I will be able to achieve most of the goals 
that I have set for myself.” 
Limited Resource 
Beliefs 
Job et al., 2010  “After strenuous mental activity, you feel 
energized for further challenging activities.” 
(mental exertion belief score)  
 “It is particularly difficult to resist a 
temptation after resisting another temptation 
right before.” (temptation belief score- R) 
Locus of Control Craig et al., 
1984 
 “A great deal of what happens to me is 
probably just a matter of chance.” (R) 
Trait Self-Control Tangney et al., 
2004 
 “I am able to work effectively toward long-
term goals.” 
Cognitive Appraisal 
Scale 
Skinner & 
Brewer, 2002 
 “I look forward to opportunities to fully test 
the limits of my skills and abilities.”  
(challenge score) 
 “I worry about the kind of impression I 
make.” (threat score) 
Entity Theory of 
Personality 
Chiu et al., 
1997 
 “People can do things differently, but the 
important parts of who they are can’t really be 
changed.” 
Entity Theory of 
Intelligence 
Chiu et al., 
1997 
 “To be honest, you can’t really change how 
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intelligent you are.” 
Self-esteem Robins et al., 
2001 
 “I have high self-esteem.” 
Inclusion of Ideal Self in 
Self Scale 
Adapted from 
Aron et al., 
1992 
 Asked which of seven increasingly 
overlapping circles best represents their 
relationship to their “ideal self” 
Inclusion of Ought Self 
in Self Scale 
Adapted from 
Aron et al., 
1992 
 Asked which of seven increasingly 
overlapping circles best represents their 
relationship to their “ought self” 
Self-Control Value Adapted from 
Tomaka et al., 
1999 
 “Exerting self-control is rewarding.” 
 “I want to be able to exert self-control 
effectively.” 
Self-Control Efficacy See Manstead 
& Eekelen, 
1998 
 “Whether or not I can resist temptations is 
completely up to me.” 
 “There’s a lot I can do to be sure that I stay 
focused on a goal over time.” 
Self-Control 
Instrumentality 
  “Being successful at self-control will improve 
my reputation with family.” 
Working Memory Task Hofmann et 
al., 2008 
 (Asked to remember a series of solution 
values while evaluating the accuracy of simple 
arithmetic equations; 10 trials) 
Note 1. Scales result in one score, unless otherwise noted; “R” signifies reverse coding. 
Note 2. Scales in questionnaire 1 only were chronic backgrounds measures, assessed prior to 
the two-week practice period. Scales in questionnaire 1 and 2 (i.e., included both before and 
after the two-week practice period), were measures of potential mediators. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Lab Measures By Time  
Measure (Time 1) Mean (SD) Skewness Kurtosis 
1. Stroop interference score 0.0633 (0.0499) 1.106 2.368 
2. Anagram persistence 319.14 (254.39) 2.124 5.043 
3. Correct anagram solutions 14.00 (7.34) 1.189 1.698 
Measure (Time 2)    
1. Stroop interference score 0.0492 (0.0369) 0.311 0.457 
2. Anagram persistence 377.64 (245.48) 1.465 2.469 
3. Correct anagram solutions 25.44 (10.62) 0.713 0.627 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Lab Measures at Time 2 By Condition   
Avoid-Sweets Condition Mean (SD) Skewness Kurtosis 
1. Stroop interference score 0.0389 (0.0365) -0.265 0.143 
2. Anagram persistence 392.16 (233.73) 1.036 0.872 
3. Correct anagram solutions 24.81 (11.45) 0.362 0.044 
Math Condition    
1. Stroop interference score 0.0605 (0.0335) 0.296 -0.553 
2. Anagram persistence 359.47 (268.49) 1.965 5.005 
3. Correct anagram solutions 26.91 (10.51) 0.936 0.669 
Self-Control Diary Condition    
1. Stroop interference score 0.04835 (0.0381) 1.017 1.358 
2. Anagram persistence 380.69 (239.53) 1.393 1.679 
3. Correct anagram solutions 24.65 (10.00) 1.091 1.968 
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Table 4 
Predictors of Time 1 Stroop Performance 
 Time 1 Stroop Interference Score 
Scales B SE (B) β 
Trait Self-Control 
General Self-Efficacy 
Unlimited Resource 
Beliefs (Mental) 
 
Unlimited Resource 
Beliefs (Temptation) 
 
Self-Control Value 
 
Self-Control Efficacy 
 
Self-Control 
Instrumentality 
 
Self-esteem 
-0.006 
0.004 
0.002 
 
 
0.002 
 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.012 
 
 
-0.003 
0.010 
0.014 
0.006 
 
 
0.007 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.012 
 
0.008 
 
 
0.006 
-0.084 
 
0.040 
 
0.032 
 
 
0.035 
 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.155 
 
 
-0.451 
Note 1. Higher Stroop interference scores indicate poorer inhibition. 
Note 2. Full model F (8, 106) = 0.388, p = .925; R
2
 = .031. 
*p < .05 
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Table 5 
Predictors of Time 1 Anagram Persistence 
 Time 1 Anagram Persistence 
Scales B SE (B) β 
Trait Self-Control 
General Self-Efficacy 
Unlimited Resource 
Beliefs (Mental) 
 
Unlimited Resource 
Beliefs (Temptation) 
 
Self-Control Value 
 
Self-Control Efficacy 
 
Self-Control 
Instrumentality 
 
Self-esteem 
48.620 
 
7.373 
 
7.791 
 
 
-0.894 
 
 
48.199 
 
10.071 
 
87.063 
 
 
-22.860 
51.547 
 
70.769 
 
31.320 
 
 
33.281 
 
 
53.086 
 
57.275 
 
39.695 
 
 
29.899 
0.127 
 
0.016 
 
0.026 
 
 
-0.003 
 
 
0.098 
 
0.025 
 
0.230
* 
 
 
-0.101 
Note 1. Full model F (8, 107) = 1.217, p = .297; R
2
 = .299. 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 6 
Predictors of Time 1 Anagram Performance 
 Time 1 Number of Correct Anagram Solutions 
Scales B SE (B) β 
Trait Self-Control 
General Self-Efficacy 
Unlimited Resource 
Beliefs (Mental) 
Unlimited Resource 
Beliefs (Temptation) 
 
Self-Control Value 
 
Self-Control Efficacy 
 
Self-Control 
Instrumentality 
 
Self-esteem 
1.023 
 
-1.632 
 
-0.996 
 
 
0.643 
 
 
-0.346 
 
-0.433 
 
2.346 
 
 
-0.874 
1.488 
 
2.043 
 
0.904 
 
 
0.961 
 
 
1.533 
 
1.654 
 
1.146 
 
 
0.863 
0.092 
 
-0.120 
 
-0.117 
 
 
0.086 
 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.038 
 
0.215
* 
 
 
-0.133 
Note 1. Full model F (8, 106) = 0.388, p = .925; R
2
 = .031. 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
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Figure 1 
Change in Unlimited Resource Beliefs By Condition 
Note 1. Error Bars: +/- 1 SE. 
 
 
 
